TEHRAN (Tasnim) – An American political analyst believes that the
recent crush outside the holy city of Mecca, Saudi Arabia, happened by
design, stressing that the Saudi regime let thousands of pilgrims die to
portray Islam as a violent religion.
“I think there is circumstantial evidence that can support the theory
that this was deliberate. We are told that the stampede was the result
of a decision that was made to close off certain routes for the
pilgrims, thus creating a situation where large numbers of people are
squeezed together in a small space. At that point, all that would be
needed would be something to precipitate a panic of some sort, and
voila’, a stampede with large numbers of deaths and a
made-for-television tragedy that can be used to further paint Muslims
and their religion as a wild, uncontrollable, dangerous force on the
world, thus justifying whatever violent methods entities such as the
West and Israel are using in dealing with it,” Mark Gelnn, from Idaho,
told the Tasnim News Agency in an exclusive interview.
Mark Glenn
is a writer and co-founder of the Crescent and Cross Solidarity
Movement, an interfaith forum dedicated to uniting Muslims and
Christians against Zionists. He has his own blog The Ugly Truth.
US-ISRAEL-UNO-EU AND THEIR ALLIES - THE GREATEST EMPIRE OF VAMPIRES, PARASITES, TERRORISM, MASS MURDER, PLUNDER, LIES, TORTURE, AND INHUMANITY IN MODERN HISTORY!
The following is the full text of the interview:
Q:
During the past few days, many countries and Islamic figures and
organizations criticized Saudi Arabia for its incompetency and
imprudence in organizing the big event as this is not the first time
such a tragedy has happened. How do you think such a great annual event
should be managed then? Do not you think that there should be a council
of several Muslim countries instead of only Saudi Arabia because Mecca
is not only the heritage of Saudi Arabia but also of the entire Muslim
world? What is your general view about this tragic event?
A: Of course, on its face the most rational and fair thing to do would
be the sharing of the responsibilities associated with providing
security. As important as the Hajj is to believers, and given the high
numbers that turn out every year for it, the most sensible thing would
be for all Islamic nations to contribute something towards the safety of
the pilgrims attending it.
However, what we must remember of
course is that this is not a ‘normal’ situation. We are talking about
Saudi Arabia, home to the most corrupt Islamic regime in existence. This
is the place where the money, training and logistics for groups such as
ISIS (ISIL) and others originates. This is the same entity that is very
comfortably in bed with nations such as the United States and Israel
and assists these two entities in slaughtering and oppressing fellow
Muslims in Syria, Libya, Gaza and elsewhere. This is the entity that has
ruthlessly murdered thousands of innocent men, women and children in
Yemen and keeps those who have not been killed in a state of desperation
and want. Why, therefore, should anyone be surprised when several
thousand people lose their lives following a stampede during the Hajj,
that was the result of (what appears to be) Saudi incompetence,
mismanagement, contempt and arrogance?
There is another darker
possibility however that must be considered, and one that unfortunately
these days, given what are political realities, cannot be summarily
dismissed, which is that the tragedy was planned to take place.
Keep in mind that Islamophobia is the intellectual gasoline powering the
engine of war, imperialism, and conquest on the part of Israel, the
United States and the West throughout the Islamic world. It is images
and ideas about Islam--some real and some contrived--forming a picture
in the minds of westerners (from which the bulk of military power
emanates) that act as the lubricants greasing the wheels of the war
machine against countries such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Iraq, Palestine,
and, if Netanyahu gets his way, Iran.
I find it very interesting
that this stampede took place at exactly the same time as waves of
Muslim immigrants fleeing conflicts around the world are arriving on the
shores of Europe, a situation that in itself could be characterized as a
stampede. And so, even though in the mind of the average Westerner the
two appear to be different, in the sense that one is political and the
other is religious, at the same time the two also reinforce each other
in creating a picture of an uncontrollable horde of people who create
havoc wherever they go.
Now, do I have any concrete evidence that
this is what took place? I think there is circumstantial evidence that
can support the theory that this was deliberate. We are told that the
stampede was the result of a decision that was made to close off certain
routes for the pilgrims, thus creating a situation where large numbers
of people are squeezed together in a small space. At that point, all
that would be needed would be something to precipitate a panic of some
sort, and voila’, a stampede with large numbers of deaths and a
made-for-television tragedy that can be used to further paint Muslims
and their religion as a wild, uncontrollable, dangerous force on the
world, thus justifying whatever violent methods entities such as the
West and Israel are using in dealing with it.
The next question
that must be asked is whether or not Saudi Arabia--again, the same
entity that has contributed to so much Muslim suffering and oppression
at the behest of the United States and Israel--would be willing to do
such a thing, and I think it is a question that has already answered
itself.
I distinctly remember in the aftermath of the terrible
tsunami that hit off the coast of Malaysia in December of 2004 hearing
commentary from Christian leaders and those under their sway that this
was a ‘sign from God’ and a ‘punishment’ because the people who perished
were Muslims, and that this was a warning that if Christian countries
allow Muslims to live in their midst that they risk the wrath of God in
the same way. Do I anticipate that similar ‘theories’ will be heard in
the Christian churches of America concerning what took place this week a
the Hajj? Definitely. The Christian churches in America are owned
almost entirely by Israel and work to further Israel’s interests and
will not waste an opportunity to propagandize their followers in the
wake of this terrible tragedy, using all the black magic they are
capable of conjuring up that will further intoxicate the minds of
Americans who represent the hired guns of Zionist aggression around the
world.
TEHRAN (Tasnim) – An American political analyst has denounced Saudi
Arabia’s lack of commitment to handling of this year’s Hajj pilgrimage
as the main cause of catastrophic incident in Mina, near Mecca,
stressing that “there is no excuse” for such a tragedy.
“Accidents happen, of course, but this is recurring event going back
centuries, and managing it to avoid such mishaps should be the highest
priority for the country hosting it. KSA is an extremely wealthy
country, and Hajj is big business for them. To the extent that the crane
failure or other incidents stem from any lack of commitment in
resources, training or attention to detail, there is no excuse,” Daniel
Patrick Welch, from Boston, said in an interview with the Tasnim News
Agency.
Daniel Patrick Welch (Donal Pádraig Breatnach) is a
writer of political commentary and analysis. An outspoken critic of US
foreign policy, he lives in the city of Salem with his wife Julia.
Together they run The Greenhouse School
(http://www.greenhouseschool.org). He has traveled widely, speaks five
languages and studied Russian History and Literature at Harvard
University.
Welch has also appeared as a guest on several TV and radio channels to speak on various topics.
The following is the full text of the interview.
Q:
During the past days, many countries and Islamic figures and
organizations have criticized Saudi Arabia for its incompetency and
imprudence in organizing the big event as this is not the first time
such a tragedy has happened. How do you think such a great annual event
should be managed then? Do not you think that there should be a council
of several Muslim countries instead of only Saudi Arabia because Mecca
is not only the heritage of Saudi Arabia but also of the entire Muslim
world?
A: The disaster has understandably raised
concerns from Muslims around the world, and reignited the debate over
whether there should be some sort of joint control over such an
important event and sites as the Hajj and Medina and Mecca. While the
sites are under sovereign control of KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), the
Hajj is a sacred duty for the entire global Muslim community. This might
be especially helpful in the interest of minimizing any alienation and
conflict between Sunni and Shiite communities, which of course both have
an equal duty to perform Hajj. A secular diplomatic analogy might be
the case of the UN being situated in New York City, under the control of
the United States, which can manipulate and use visa restrictions to
harass governments which it regards as hostile. Borders and national
sovereignty should not serve to give one group disproportionate control
over sites or systems in which an entire global community has an
interest.
Q: Do you believe that Saudi Arabia is no
longer able to manage and provide safety and security for a crowd of two
million Muslim pilgrims in an event that the circumstances are
well-known beforehand?
A: While it is easy to take pot
shots at those in control over what could be simply a horrible accident,
the presumption in your question is correct: Accidents happen, of
course, but this is recurring event going back centuries, and managing
it to avoid such mishaps should be the highest priority for the country
hosting it. KSA is an extremely wealthy country, and Hajj is big
business for them. To the extent that the crane failure or other
incidents stem from any lack of commitment in resources, training or
attention to detail, there is no excuse.
Q: According to
reports, the care-taking staff appointed by the Saudi government to be in
charge of this year’s Hajj are not properly trained and lack essential
skills to run the big event. Do not you think that this failure is
mainly because the Saudi government is using its experienced and
well-trained forces in wars with its neighboring countries?
A: This is obviously speculative, so it is impossible to know for sure.
But it does beg the larger question raised above over commitment of
resources. Again, KSA is a wealthy kingdom, and has all the resources
necessary if properly applied, so if this is not happening it is fair to
look at where those resources are being used. Once again using the
analogy to the US, attention is often drawn to the vast sums being spent
on the war budget and foreign military campaigns as domestic
infrastructure is untended and crumbling into dust. These questions will
also receive more attention as KSA moves into the spotlight by assuming
leadership of the UN Human Rights Council, which many have criticized
given its own egregious human rights record.
It (Saudi Arabia) is
also involved not only in the illegal war on Yemen, but implicated in
the death squad proxy wars in Libya, Syria and a host of other countries
on behalf of and in conjunction with the US, along with other [P]GCC
states, Turkey, Jordan and so on. Specifically relating to Hajj, these
activities have actually led many Muslims to call for a boycott of Hajj.
I doubt this is something that will happen any time soon--but adherents
point out that while Hajj is a duty for all Muslims at some point in
life, there is no pressing need for it to be done, for example, this
year. So the rising questions surrounding the pilgrimage are something
the Saudis would be wise to take seriously.
After twenty months in prison Louise was loaded onto the ship the Virginie
on 8 August 1873 to be deported to New Caledonia, where she arrived
four months later. Whilst on board, she became acquainted with Henri
Rochefort, a famous polemicist, who became her lifelong friend. She also
met Nathalie Lemel, another figure active in the Commune. It was this
latter contact that led Louise to become an anarchist. She remained in
New Caledonia for seven years and befriended the local Kanak people.
Taking an interest in Kanak legends, cosmology and languages,
particularly the bichelamar creole, she learned about Kanak culture from
friendships she had made with Kanak people. She taught French to the
Kanaks and took their side in the 1878 Kanak revolt. The following year,
she received authorisation to become a teacher in Nouméa for the
children of the deported — among them many Algerian Kabyles (“Kabyles du
Pacifique”) from Cheikh Mokrani’s 1871 rebellion.
The 1880 amnesty and her return to France
In 1880, amnesty was granted to those who had participated in the
Paris Commune. Louise returned to Paris, her revolutionary passion
undiminished. She gave a public address on 21 November 1880 and
continued her revolutionary activity in Europe, attending the anarchist
congress in London in 1881, where she led demonstrations and spoke to
huge crowds. While in London, she also attended meetings at the Russell
Square home of the Pankhursts where she made a particular impression on a
young Sylvia Pankhurst. In France she successfully campaigned, together
with Charles Malato and Victor Henri Rochefort, for an amnesty to be
also granted to Algerian deportees in New Caledonia.
In March 1883 Louise and Émile Pouget led a demonstration of
unemployed workers. In a subsequent riot, 500 demonstrators pillaged
three bakeries and shouted “Bread, work, or lead”. Louise was accused of
having led this demonstration with a black flag, which has since become
a symbol of anarchism.
Louise was tried for her actions in the riot and used the court to
publicly defend her anarchist principles. She was sentenced to six years
of solitary confinement for inciting the looting. She was defiant at
her trial; for her, the future of the human race was at stake, “One
without exploiters and without exploited.” She was released in 1886, at
the same time as Kropotkin and other prominent anarchists.
In 1888, Louise survived an assassination attempt when Pierre Lucas
shot her head point-blank. A bullet lodged in the left side of her skull
and could never be removed. Louise refused to press charges against
him, wrote numerous letters requesting that the police charges be
dropped, and paid a lawyer to represent him at trial. You can read a newspaper article about the event here.
United Nations Human Rights Amnesty International Bichelamar Creole
Deklereisen Blong Raet Blong Evri Man Mo Woman Raon Wol
FESTOK
From se Jenerol Asembli i luksave respek mo ikwol raet blong man mo woman olsem stamba blong fridom, jastis mo pis long wol,
From se fasin blong no luksave mo no respektem ol raet blong man mo
woman i mekem se i gat ol nogud aksen i tekemples we oli mekem se pipol i
kros, mo bambae wan taem i kam we pipol bambae i glad long fridom blong
toktok mo biliv blong hem, fridom blong no fraet mo wantem samting hemi
kamaot olsem nambawan tingting blong ol grasrut pipol,
From se hemi wan impoten samting, sipos man i no fos blong lukaotem
help, olsem wan las aksen we hemi save mekem, blong faet agensem rabis
fasin blong spoelem no fosem pipol hemia blong mekem nomo se Loa i
protektem ol raet blong man mo woman,
From se i gat nid blong promotem fasin blong developem frensip wetem ol narafala kaontri,
From se ol pipol blong Unaeted Neisen oli talem bakegen insaed long
Jata strong tingting blong olgeta long ol stamba raet blong man mo
woman, respek mo valiu blong man mo woman mo long ikwol raet blong man
mo woman, oli disaed blong promotem sosol progres mo ol standed blong
laef we i moa gud mo we i gat moa fridom,
From se ol Memba Kaontri oli mekem strong promis blong promotem
respek blong ol raet blong man mo woman olbaot long wol mo gat ol stamba
fridom taem we oli stap wok tugeta wetem Unaeted Neisen,
From se hemi impoten tumas blong evriwan i luksave ol raet mo fridom blong promis ia i save tekemples fulwan,
Hemi mekem se JENEROL ASEMBLI i putumaot
Deklereisen blong ol Raet blong evri Man mo Woman Raon long Wol olsem
wan impoten samting we evri pipol mo evri kaontri long wol oli mas
kasem, blong mekem se wanwan man mo woman insaed long sosaeti oli
tingting oltaem long Deklereisen ia, bambae oli wok had tru long tijing
mo edukeisen blong leftemap resek long ol raet mo fridom ia mo tru ol
step we oli tekem long nasonol mo intenasonol level, blong mekem se ol
pipol blong ol Memba Kaontri mo ol pipol blong ol teritori we oli stap
anda long olgeta blong oli luksave mo folem Deklereisen ia.
Atikol 1
Evri man mo woman i bon fri mo ikwol long respek mo ol raet. Oli gat
risen mo tingting mo oli mas tritim wanwan long olgeta olsem ol brata
mo sista.
Atikol 2
Evriwan i gat raet long evri raet mo fridom we i stap long
Deklereisen ia, wetaot eni kaen difrens, olsem long reis, kala blong
skin, seks, langwis, rilijen, politikol o narafala kaen tingting, we i
kamaot long saed blong neisen o sosol, propeti, taem we man i bon long
hem o emi narafala sosol saed olsem.
Andap long hemia, bambae wan man o woman i no save mekem eni difrens
long level blong politik, eria we wok hem i kavremap o intenasonol
level blong kaontri o teritori blong narafala man o woman ia, nomata we
hemi indipenden, tras, non-self-gavening o anda eni narafala arenjmen
blong soverenti.
Atikol 3
Evriwan i gat raet blong laef, fridommo sekuriti blong man mo woman.
Atikol 4
Bambae man i no tekem narafala man o woman olsem slev blong hem.
Bambae hemi agensem loa blong eni kaen fasin blong slev mo fasin blong
salem man o woman olsem slev i tekemples.
Atikol 5
Bambae man mo woman i no save mekem fasin blong mekem narafala man o
woman i safa o mekem rabis fasin long hem, fasin we i nogud long man o
woman o tritim man o woman long fasin o panismen we i soem se man o
woman i luk daon long man o woman.
Atikol 6
Evriwan i gat raet blong narafala man i luksave hem olsem wan man o woman we i stap anda long loa.
Atikol 7
Evri man mo woman i semak folem loa mo oli gat semak raet wetaot eni
diskrismineisen blong loa i protektem olgeta. Evri man mo woman oli
gat raet blong loa ia i protektem olgeta long ikwol fasin agensem
diskrimineisen long taem we man mo woman i brekem wan pat blong
Deklereisen ia mo agensem eni fasin blong mekem se i gat diskrimineisen
olsem.
Atikol 8
Evriwan i gat raet blong kasem wan stret fasin blong stretem problem
we ol stret nasonol traebuno blong ol akt we oli go agensem ol stamba
raet we Konstitusen o loa givim, oli mekem.
Atikol 9
Bambae man o woman i no save arestem narafala man o woman long fasin
we i folem tingting blong hem nomo, fasin blong givim panismen o fasin
blong mekem man i stap hemwan olsem panismen.
Atikol 10
Evriwan i gat raet blong ful ikwaliti long wan indipenden mo fea
pablik hearing we wan indipenden mo fea tribunal i putum, long taem
blong disaedem ol raet mo ol obligeisen blong hem mo blong eni kriminol
jasmen agensem hem.
Atikol 11
Eniwan we i gat jasmen blong wan rong agensem hem hemi gat raet
blong stap olsem wan inosen man o woman go kasem taem we kot i pruvum se
hemi gilti from se hemi mekem rong agensem loa long wan pablik traeol
we hemi bin gat evri janis we hemi nidim blong difendem hemwan.
Bambae man o woman i no gilti from wan rong we hemi mekem o wan
aksen we hemi no mekem we i no wan rong folem nasonal mo intenasonal
loa, long taem we man o woman ia i mekem aksen ia. Bambae i nogat wan
panismen we i hevi bitim hemia we i aplae long taem ia we man o woman ia
i bin mekem rong ia.
Atikol 12
Bambae man o woman i no save intefea wetem praevet laef, famili, hom
or korespondens blong narafala man o woman folem tingting blong hem, mo
no save spolem hae respek mo gudfala nem blong hem. Evriwan i gat raet
blong loa i protektem hem agensem ol fasin blong intefea olsem o atak.
Atikol 13
Evriwan i gat raet blong kasem fridom blong go long weaples hemi wantem go mo blong stap insaed long eria blong wanwan steit.
Evriwan i gat raet blong livim eni kaontri, we i minim se kaontri blong hem tu mo blong hemi go bak long kaontri blong hem.
Atikol 14
Evriwan i gat raet blong lukaotem mo stap long wan ples long wan
narafala kaontri sipos hemi stap ronwe long ol fasin blong talem mo
tritum nogud man o woman.
Man o woman i no save yusum raet ia taem i gat prosekusen we i
kamaot folem ol kraem we oli no kamaot from politik o from ol aksen we
oli no folem ol eim mo prinsipol blong Unaeted Neisesn.
Atikol 15
Evriwan i gat raet blong gat wan nasonaliti.
Bambae wan man o woman i nogat raet blong kiaman long wan man o
woman long nasonaliti blong hem o kiaman long raet blong jenisim
nasonaliti blong hem.
Atikol 16
Evri man mo woman long evri eij, nomata wanem reis, nasonaliti o
rilijen, oli gat raet blong maret mo blong statem wan famili. Oli gat
raet long ikwel raet long saed blong maret, long taem blong maret mo
long taem we oli disolvem maret.
Maret bambae i tekemples nomo taem we hemi tingting blong man mo woman ia blong tufala i maret.
Famili hemi natural mo impoten grup unit blong sosaeti mo hemi gat raet blong sosaeti mo steit i protektem hem.
Atikol 17
Evriwan i gat raet blong onem wan propeti hemwan mo tu wetem ol narafala man o woman tugeta.
Folem tingting blong hem, bambae wan man o woman i no save kiaman long narafala man o woman from propeti blong hem.
Atikol 18
Evriwan i gat raet long fridom blong tingting, fridom blong morol
tingting blong jasmen mo rilijen; raet ia hemi kavremap fridom blong
jenisim rilijen o bilif blong hem, mo fridom blong hem hemwan o tugeta
wetem ol narafala man o woman long komuniti mo long pablik o praevet
laef, blong soem rilijen blong hem tru long fasin we hemi tijim,
praktisim, wosip mo folem ol tijing blong rilijen blong hem o biliv
blong hem.
Atikol 19
Evriwan i gat raet long fridom blong talem tingting blong hem mo
talem long wei we hemi wantem; raet ia hemi kavremap fridom blong save
gat ol difren tingting wetaot man i intefea mo blong risivim mo givimaot
infomeisen mo ol tingting tru long niuspepa, televisen o radio nomata
long ol baondri blong ol kaontri.
Atikol 20
Evriwan i gat raet long fridom blong mit wanples mo grup tugeta long fasin we i gat pis long hem.
Wan man o woman i no save fosem narafala man o woman blong stap long wan asosiesen.
Atikol 21
Evriwan i gat raet blong tekpat long Gavman blong kaontri blong
hem, daerek o tru long ol representativ we olgeta pipol oli jusum folem
tingting blong olgeta.
Evriwan i gat raet long semak janis blong kasem sevis blong Gavman long kaontri blong hem.
Bambae pipol oli jusum kaen Gavman we oli wantem blong rul; fasin
blong jusum Gavman ia bambae i kamaot tru ol eleksen long wanwan period
mo bambae evri man mo woman i gat raet blong vot long sekret folem ol
fasin blong fri vot.
Atikol 22
Evriwan, olsem memba blong sosaeti, i gat raet blong kasem sosol
sekuriti mo hemi gat raet blong kasem ol ekonomik, sosol mo kaljarol
raet blong hem we hemi nidim from respek blong hem mo blong mekem se
hemi fri blong developem hemwan, hemia tru long help mo hadwok blong
nasonol mo intenasonol komuniti mo folem oganaeseisen mo risos blong
wanwan Kaontri.
Atikol 23
Evriwan i gat raet blong wok, blong jusum wanem wok hemi wantem
mekem, blong stap long ol gudfala kondisen blong wok mo blong gat
proteksen agensem fasim blong nogat wok.
Evriwan, wetaot diskrimineisen, i gat raet blong kasem ikwol pei blong mekem semak wok.
Evriwan we i wok oli gat raet long stret mo gudfala pei we i mekem
se hem mo famili blong hem i save gat wan gudfala laef we i soem se i
gat respek, mo i kasem tu ol narafala kaen proteksen long sosol laef
blong hem, sipos i gat nid.
Evriwan i gat raet blong fomem mo joenem ol tred union blong protektem ol intres blong olgeta.
Atikol 24
Evriwan i gat raet blong spel mo enjoem hem, we i minim se i mas gat
limit long ol haoa blong wok mo blong oli gat holidei wetem pei wanwan
taem.
Atikol 25
Evriwan i gat raet long wan standed blong laef we i stret long helt
mo welfea blong hem mo famili blong hem, hemia long saed blong kakae,
klos, haos mo medikol kea mo ol narafala sosol sevis, mo raet long
sekuriti long taem we man o woman i no wok, i sik, wan pat blong bodi i
nogat o no save wok gud, woman i lusum man blong hem o man i lususm
woman blong hem, taem hemi olfala o taem hemi no save gat wan gudfala
laef from sam samting we hemwan i no save kontrolem.
Mama mo pikinini oli gat raet blong kasem spesel kea mo help. Evri
pikinini, nomata we oli bon long mama mo papa we tufala i mared o no
mared, bambae oli kasem semak protektek long sosol laef blong olgeta tu.
Atikol 26
Evriwan i gat raet blong kasem edukeisen. Bambae edukeisen hemi
fri, sipos i no long ol narafala level be bambae hemi hapen long ol
elementeri mo fes level blong skul. Bambae evri pikinini i mas go long
wan elementeri skul. Bambae i mas gat teknikol mo profesonal edukeisen
we pipol i save folem sipos oli wantem mo bambae evri man mo woman i gat
raet blong kasem hae edukeisen folem merit.
Edukeisen bambae hemi blong developem fulwan ol defren kaen fasin
blong man mo woman mo blong leftemap respek blong ol raet blong man mo
woman mo ol stamba fridom. Edukeisen bambae hemi promotem fasin blong
andastanem, luksave nid mo mekem fren wetem evri kaontri, evri difren
kaen reis mo rilijes grup blong pipol mo bambae hemi mekem ol wok blong
Unaeted Neisen blong kipim pis oltaem.
Papa mo mama blong pikinini oli gat raet blong jusum kaen edukeisen we bambae pikinini blong tufala i kasem.
Atikol 27
Evriwan i gat raet blong tekempat olsem hemi wantem long kaljarol
laef blong komuniti, blong enjoem ol art mo serem ol save blong saens we
i stap kam andap mo ol benefit blong hem.
Evriwan i gat raet blong protektem ol morol mo materiol interes we i
kamoat folem eni wok we man mo woman i prodiusum long saed blong saens,
litereja mo art we hemi bin raetem.
Atikol 28
Evriwan i gat raet long wan sosol mo intenasonol oda we i mekem se
oli save yusum fulwan ol raet mo fridom we oli stap insaed long
Deklereisen ia.
Atikol 29
Evriwan i gat diuti blong mekem i go long komuniti we tru long hem
nomo bambae hemi fri blong save developem fulwan fasin blong hem olsem
wan man o woman.
Taem we man mo woman i stap yusum ol raet mo fridom ia, bambae
evriwan i mas folem ol limit we oli stap insaed long loa blong mekem se
man i luksave mo respektem ol raet mo fridom blong ol narafala pipol mo
blong folem ol rul blong gudfala fasin, pablik oda mo jenerol welfea
long wan demokratik sosaeti.
Man mo woman i no save yusum ol raet mo fridom ia long wei we i agensem ol tingting mo prinsipol blong Unaeted Neisens.
Atikol 30
Wan man o woman i no save yusum wan pat blong Deklereisen ia blong
mekem se Steit, o wan grup o man o woman i ting se hemi gat raet blong
mekem eni aktiviti o blong mekem eni aksen we i go agensem ol raet mo
fridom we i stap insaed long Deklereisen ia.
The Mokrani Revolt (Arabic: مقاومة الشيخ المقراني, lit. 'Resistance of Cheikh El-Mokrani'; Berber languages: Unfaq urrumi, lit. 'French insurrection') was the most important local uprising against France in Algeria since the conquest in 1830.
Bou Mezrag El Mokrani, circa 1874. From Gabriel Esquer's historic iconography of Algeria since the 17th century until 1871, Alger 1930, board CCCXLIX, view 933.
Cheikh Mokrani presentation
Cheikh Mokrani (full name el-Hadj-Mohamed el-Mokrani) and his brother Boumezrag (full name Ahmed Bou-Mezrag) came from a noble family - the Ait Abbas dynasty (a branch of the Hafsids of Béjaïa), the Amokrane, rulers, since the sixteenth century of the Kalâa of Ait Abbas in the Bibans and of the Medjana region.[4] In the 1830s, their father el-Hadj-Ahmed el-Mokrani (d. 1853), had chosen to form an alliance with the French : he allowed the Iron Gates expedition in 1839, becoming thus khalifa of the Medjana under the supervision of French authorities.[5] This alliance quickly proved to be a subordination - a decree of 1845 abolished the khalifalik of Medjana so that when Mohamed succeeded his father, his title was no more than “Bachagha [fr]” (Turkish: başağa = chief commander), and was part of the administration of the Bureaux arabes.[6]: 35 During the hardships of 1867, he gave his personal guarantee, at the request of the authorities, for important loans.
The context
The
background of the revolt is as important as the revolt itself. In 1830,
French army took up Algiers. Since then, France colonized the country,
setting up its own administration all over Algeria. Shortly after 1830, a
resistance rose up, led by Abd al-Kader, which lasted till 1847. French
administrations and the France government decided to repress this
movement which impacted both people and agriculture. The late 1860s were
hard for the people of Algeria: between 1866 and 1868 they lived
through drought, exceptionally cold winters, an epidemic of cholera and an earthquake. More than 10% of the Kabyle population died during this period.[1]
Thus, at the end of the 1860s, Algeria was exhausted and the demography
at its worst. To sum up all those events, on March 9, 1870, the French
government decided to put a civilian regime in Algeria, which gave more
advantages to French colonizers. In 1870, the creditors demanded to be
repaid and the French authorities reneged on the loan on the pretext of
the Franco-Prussian War, leaving Mohamed forced to pawn his own possessions. On June 12, 1869, Marshall MacMahon,
the Governor General, advised the French government that “the Kabyles
will stay peaceful as long as they see no possibility of driving us out
of their country.”[7]
Under the French Second Republic, the country was governed by a Governor General and a large proportion was "military territory".[8][9]
There were tensions between the French colonists and the army; the
former favouring the abolition of the military territory as being too
protective of the native Algerians.[10] Eventually, on March 9, 1870, the Corps législatif passed a law which would end the military regime in Algeria.[11] When Napoleon III fell and the Third French Republic was proclaimed, the Algerian question fell under the remit of the new Justice Minister, Adolphe Crémieux,
and not, as previously, under the Minister of War. At the same time,
Algeria was experiencing a period of anarchy. The settlers, hostile to
Napoleon III and strongly Republican, took advantage of the fall of the
Second Empire to push forward their anti-military agenda. Real
authority devolved to town councils and local defence committees, and
their pressure resulted in the Crémieux Decree.
Meanwhile, on September 1, 1870, the French army was defeated by
the Prussian army in Sedan, and lost the French part of Alsace-Lorraine.
The fact that France was at this time defeated by another country
brought hope to Algerians. Indeed, the news of the French defeat on its
border was spread thanks to the paper news. Then, Algerian protests
began in public places, and in the South of Algeria, people committee
were established to organized the revolt.
Revolt's origins
Algerians inhabitants and the Second Empire
A
number of causes have been suggested for the Mokrani revolt. There was a
general dissatisfaction among Kabyle notables because of the steady
erosion of their authority by the colonial authorities. At the same
time, ordinary people were concerned about the imposition of civilian
rule on March 9, 1870, which they interpreted as imposing domination by
the settlers, with encroachments on their land and loss of autonomy.[12]
The Cremieux decree
The
Cremieux Decree of October 24, 1870, which gave French nationality to
Algerian Jews was possibly another cause of the unrest.[6]: 119 [13] However some historians view this as doubtful, pointing out that this story only started to spread after the revolt was over.[14] This explanation of the revolt was particularly widespread among French antisemites.[15] News of the insurrectionary Paris commune also played a part.[16]
Indeed, from March 18 until May 28, 1871, Paris was under the Commune,
which was an autonomous commune administered under direct democracy
principles. This Commune was also the hope to found a social and
democratic Republic. Thus, the episode of the Paris Commune resonated in
Algeria as a new possibility to take over the French administration
established in Algeria.
Several months before the start of the insurrections, Kabyle
village communities multiply gatherings of electing village assemblies
("tiǧmaʿīn", Arabic "ǧamāʿa") despite the colonial authorities having
banned them from doing so. It must be emphasised that those "ǧamāʿa"
were managing bodies to the population, therefore an obstacle to French
policy . On social matters those assemblies would decide rules for the
community. They were composed with a president "amin", a treasurer named
a "ukil" and some men of the village elected to verify the members
(patrilineage) or because they are really elder.
The first signs of actual revolt appeared in the mutiny of a squadron of the 3rd Regiment of Spahis in January 1871. The spahis (Muslim cavalry troopers in the French Army of Africa) refused to be sent to fight in metropolitan France,[17] claiming that they were only required to serve in Algeria. This mutiny began in Moudjebeur, near Ksar Boukhari on January 20, 1871, spread to Aïn Guettar (in the region of modern Khemissa, near Souk Ahras) on January 23, 1871, and soon reached El Tarf and Bouhadjar.[18]
Cheikh Mokrani's dissidence
The
mutiny at Aïn Guettar involved the mass desertion of several hundred
men and the killing of several officers. It took on a particular
significance for the Rezgui family, whose members maintained that
France, recently defeated by the Prussians,
was a spent force and that now was the time for a general uprising. The
Hanenchas responded to this call, killing fourteen colonists in their
territory; Souk Ahras was besieged from 26th to 28 January, before being
relieved by a French column, who then put down the insurgency and
condemned five men to death.[18]
Mokrani submitted his resignation as bachagha in March 1871, but
the army replied that only the civil government could now accept it. In
reply, Mokrani wrote to General Augeraud, subdivisional commander at
Sétif:[19]
"You know the matter which puts me
at odds with you; I can only repeat to you what you already know - I do
not wish to be the agent of the civil government..... I am preparing
myself to fight you; today let each of us take up his rifle."[13]
The spahi mutiny was reignited after March 16, 1871, when Mokrani took charge of it.[13] On March 16, Mokrani led six thousands men in an assault on Bordj Bou Arreridj.[20] On April 8, French troops regained control of the Medjana plain. The same day, Si Aziz, son of Cheikh al-Haddad, head of the Rahmaniyya order, proclaimed a holy war in the market of Seddouk.[13] Soon 150,000 Kabyles rose,[21]
as the revolt spread along the coast first, then into the mountains to
the east of the Mitidja and as far as Constantine. It then spread to the
Belezma mountains and linked with local insurrections all the way down to the Sahara desert.[22] As they spread towards Algiers itself, the insurgents took Lakhdaria
(Palestro), 60 km east of the capital, on the 14th of April. By April,
250 tribes had risen, or nearly a third of Algeria's population. One
hundred thousand “mujahidin”, poorly armed and disorganised, were
launching random raids and attacks.[12]
French counterattack
The military authorities brought in reinforcements for the Army of Africa; Admiral de Gueydon, who took over as Governor General on March 29, replacing Special Commissioner Alexis Lambert [fr], mobilised 22,000 soldiers.[1] Advancing from Palestro towards Algiers, the rebels were stopped at Boudouaou (Alma) on April 22, 1871, by colonel Alexandre Fourchault under the command of General Orphis Léon Lallemand; on May 5,[1] Mohamed el-Mokrani died fighting at Oued Soufflat, halfway between Lakhdaria (Palestro) and Bouira in an encounter with the troops of General Félix Gustave Saussier [fr].[20]
On 25 April, the Governor General declared a state of siege.[23] Twenty columns of French troops marched on Dellys and Draâ El Mizan. Cheikh al-Haddad and his sons were captured on July 13, after the battle of Icheriden.[24] The revolt only faded after the capture of Bou-Mezrag, Cheikh Mokrani's brother, on January 20, 1872.[25]
Repression
Sequestration order from the extraordinary commissioner of the République, concerning Cheikh Mokrani's goods. Administrative poster, 1871.
During the fighting, around 100 European civilians died, along with an unknown number of Algerian civilians.[1] After fighting ceased, more than 200 Kabyles were interned[26] and others deported to Cayenne[26] and New Caledonia, where they were known as Algerians of the Pacific.[27] Bou-Mezrag Mokrani was condemned to death by a court in Constantine on March 27, 1873.
The Kabylie region was subjected to a collective fine of 36
millions francs, and 450,000 hectares of land were confiscated and given
to new settlers, many of whom were refugees from Alsace-Lorraine,[26][1] especially in the region of Constantine. The repression and confiscations forced a lot of Kabyles to leave the country.[1]
After the end of the hostilities of the insurrection of Cheikh Mokrani, the Algerian rebel leaders who were captured alive appeared before the Assize Court of Algiers
on December 27, 1872, on a count of indictment and an act of accusation
linked to the sacking of the French colonies, the assassinations, fires
and looting which sparked heated debates on this extremely important
affair.[28]
Several criminal charges weighed on each of the offender who all,
without exception, had taken part in the insurrection. The prosecution
of the court made charges which weighed on each of the accused for the
crimes alleged against these main leaders and leaders of the 1871
insurrection.
The list of these incarcerated rebel leaders is as follows:
A long list was then enumerated of the names of other subordinate
rebel Algerian leaders and natives who participated in the Alma and
Palestro massacres.
After reading the indictment, including the whole so-called
Palestro affair, which lasted about an hour and a half, the president of
the assize court urged the jurors to follow on the notebook that was
given to them, and where the name of each offender was written at the
top of a page, the individual examination which will be carried out and
to take notes due to the length of the debates.
The leaders of the Mokrani Revolt after their capture and trial in 1873 were either executed, subjected to forced labor, or deported and exiled to the Pacific and New Caledonia.[30][31]
A convoy of 40 Kabyle insurrectional leaders was undertaken on the ship La Loire on June 5, 1874, towards the L'Île-des-Pins for deportation. They were the symbols of Algerian resistance against the French occupation.[32]
The specialist in history Malika Ouennoughi drew up a list of these 40 deportees, whose names follow:[33]
Ahmed ben Ali Seghir ben Mohamed Ouallal, born in 1854 at Baghlia, was a farmer, with the matricule: 852.
Ahmed Kerbouchene, born in 1829 at Larbaâ Nath Irathen, was a farmer, with the matricule: 883.
Ahmed ben Mohamed ben Barah, born in 1829 at Dar El Beïda, was a farmer, with the matricule: 859.
Ahmed ben Belkacem ben Abdallah, born in 1822 at Oued Djer, was an indigene, with the matricule: 1306.
Ahmed ben Ahmed Bokrari, born in 1838 at Bou Saâda, was an farmer, with the matricule: 857.
Abdallah ben Ali ben Djebel, born in 1844 at Guelma, was a spahi, with the matricule: 803.
Ahmed ben Salah ben Amar ben Belkacem, born in 1809 at Souk Ahras, was an caïd, with the matricule: 854.
On May 18, 1874, the leaders of the Mokrani Revolt were embarked at the Port of Brest [fr] in the 9th convoy of deportees from the ship La Loire placed under the orders of captain Adolphe Lucien Mottez [fr] (1822-1892).[34]
They numbered 50 Algerian deportees, and were reinforced with 280 other French convicts from the jails of Fort Quélern, and at their head the marabout Cheikh Boumerdassi.[35]
This ship arrived on June 7, at the anchorage of the port of Île-d'Aix, where it embarked 700 passengers, including 40 women, and 320 other French deportees.[36]
On June 9, he left for Nouméa, and it was therefore the 9th convoy of deportees that left France to then stop on June 23, in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, to arrive in Nouméa on October 16, 1874.
After a last stopover in Santa Catarina Island, La Loire arrives in Nouméa on October 16, 1874, after a journey of 133 days.[37]
There will be around 5 deaths at sea and on November 10, of the
same year, the ship "La Loire" left Nouméa to return to France after
having disembarked the convicts from Kabylie.[38]
On the 40 or 50 Algerians mentioned, 39 were destined for simple deportation to the L'Île-des-Pins, and only one of them for deportation to a fortified enclosure.
On the 300 convoys in the convoy, 250 suffered from scurvy, and will die in the weeks following their arrival in New Caledonia according to Roger Pérennès.[39][40]
In Mémoires d'un Communard, Jean Allemane evokes a deadly epidemic of dysentery which decimated the transported people that La Loire had just landed, and who were buried in large numbers.[41][42]
Begun at dawn, the burial of the corpses was a task which often
did not end until nightfall, and the men who had died of dysentery
presented a morbid spectacle.[43][44]
More than two hundred convicts who had come by the Loire died almost immediately after their disembarkation.[45]
However Louis-José Barbançon reports that on the civil status registers of the Bagne of L'Île-des-Pins,
which were very well kept, only 28 deaths of convicts who came by "La
Loire" appeared in the 6 months after arrival of the ship.[46][47]
Bozarslan, Hamit. Sociologie politique du Moyen-Orient, Collection Repères, La Découverte, 2011.
Brett, Michael. “Algeria 1871–1954 - Histoire de l’Algérie
Contemporaine. Vol. 11: De L’insurrection de 1871 Au Déclenchement de La
Guerre de Libération (1954). By Charles-Robert Ageron. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1979. Pp. 643. No Price Stated.” Journal of
African history 22.3 (1981): 421–423. Web.
Brett, Michael. “Algeria 1871–1954.” The Journal of African History 1981: 421–423.
De Grammont, H.-D. “RINN, Histoire de l’insurrection de 1871 en
Algérie.” Revue Critique d’Histoire et de Littérature 25.2 (1891): 301–.
Print.
De Peyerimhoff, Henri. “La colonisation officielle en Algérie de 1871 à 1895.” Revue Économique Française 1928: 369–. Print.
De Peyerimhoff, Henri de, and Comité Bugeaud. La colonisation
officielle de 1871 à 1895 : [rapport à M. Jonnart, gouverneur général de
l’Algérie]. Paris Tunis: Société d’éditions géographiques, maritimes et
coloniales Comité Bugeaud, 1928. Print.
Jalla, Bertrand. “L’autorité judiciaire dans la répression de de
1871 en Algérie.” Outre-mers (Saint-Denis) 88.332 (2001): 389–405. Web.
Merle, Isabelle . “Algérien en Nouvelle-Calédonie : Le destin
calédonien du déporté Ahmed Ben Mezrag Ben Mokrani.” L’année du Maghreb
20 (2019): 263–281. Web.
Mottez, Adolphe Lucien (1875). Deux Expériences faites à bord de la Loire pendant un voyage en Nouvelle-Calédonie. 1874-1875. p. 83.
Lewis, Bernard. Histoire du Moyen-Orient, Albin Michel, 2000.
Robin, Joseph, Mahé, Alain. L’insurrection de la Grande Kabylie en 1871. Saint-Denis: Éditions Bouchène, 2018. Print.
Sicard, Christian. La Kabylie en feu : Algérie 1871. Paris: Georges Sud, 2013. Print.
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“I think there is circumstantial evidence that can support the theory
that this was deliberate. We are told that the stampede was the result
of a decision that was made to close off certain routes for the
pilgrims, thus creating a situation where large numbers of people are
squeezed together in a small space. At that point, all that would be
needed would be something to precipitate a panic of some sort, and
voila’, a stampede with large numbers of deaths and a
made-for-television tragedy that can be used to further paint Muslims
and their religion as a wild, uncontrollable, dangerous force on the
world, thus justifying whatever violent methods entities such as the
West and Israel are using in dealing with it,” Mark Gelnn, from Idaho,
told the Tasnim News Agency in an exclusive interview.
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